Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2008

Incorporation and Originalist Theory
Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown University Law Center, lbs32@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/861
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346453

18 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 409-446 (2009)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the
Rule of Law Commons

INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC

1/20/10 12:36 PM

Incorporation and Originalist Theory†

LAWRENCE B. SOLUM*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF INCORPORATION FOR
ORIGINALIST THEORY ..........................................................................................410
A. What is Originalism?.................................................................................411
B. What is Incorporation?..............................................................................416
C. Narrowing the Scope of Inquiry to Privileges
or Immunities .............................................................................................417
D. Roadmap ....................................................................................................419
PUBLIC MEANING OF “THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES” FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS ...............................419
A. Two Assumptions .......................................................................................419
1. Assumption One: “Original Meaning” Is Public
Meaning for Ordinary Citizens ..........................................................420

† © 2009 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this paper for
scholarly or teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple copies or post
on the Internet for classroom use and to quote extended passages in scholarly work,
subject only to the requirement that this copyright notice, the title of the article, and the
name of the author be prominently included in the copy or extended excerpt. Permission
is hereby granted to use short excerpts (500 words or less each, so long as the total word
count of the excerpts does not exceed 50% of the total word count of this work) with an
appropriate citation and without inclusion of a copyright notice. In the event of the death
or permanent incapacity of the author, all claims to copyright in the work are
relinquished and the work is dedicated to the public domain in perpetuity. Even if the
author is then living, all copyright claims are relinquished as of January 1, 2050. In the
event that the relinquishment of copyright is not given legal effect, an unlimited license
of all rights to all persons for all purposes is granted as of that date.
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, John E. Cribbet Professor of Law,
and Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois College of Law. I owe thanks to Eric
Claeys and Jason Mazzone for comments on an earlier draft.

409

INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC

1/20/10 12:36 PM

2.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

Assumption Two: Incorporation Must Be
Justified by Interpretation Without the Aid
of Construction ...................................................................................421
B. How Could Incorporation Be Justified as an
Interpretation Based on “Public Meaning” for
Ordinary Citizens? ....................................................................................421
C. The Problems of Exclusion and Inclusion .................................................423
D. The Meaning of “Of” ................................................................................424
1. Privileges or Immunities that Any Citizen
of the United States Happens to Possess:
The All-rights Interpretation ..............................................................424
2. Privileges or Immunities that Citizens
Possess by Virtue of the National Citizenship:
The In-Virtue-Of Interpretation..........................................................425
3. Privileges or Immunities that are Shared by
Citizens of the United States: The
Shared-Rights Interpretation..............................................................426
4. Resolving the Ambiguity Regarding the
Meaning of “Of” ................................................................................426
E. The Assumptions Revisited ........................................................................428
“PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES” AS A TERM OF ART ...............................................428
A. The Division of Linguistic Labor...............................................................429
B. “Privileges or Immunities” as a Term of Art ............................................431
1. Corfield v. Coryell..............................................................................432
2. Blackstone...........................................................................................434
C. The Implications for Incorporation ...........................................................435
CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE...............................436
A. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction Revisited .............................436
B. Incorporation and Vagueness....................................................................438
C. Incorporation and Irreducible Ambiguity .................................................440
FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION .................................................442
A. Failure of Constitutional Communication in Theory ................................442
B. The (Hypothetical) Case for the Failure of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause................................................................443
C. Incorporation as a Mending Construction ................................................444
CONCLUSION: WHY INCORPORATION MATTERS FOR
ORIGINALISTS ......................................................................................................445

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF INCORPORATION
FOR ORIGINALIST THEORY
Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
incorporate the Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments?
And how should an originalist answer that question? This paper focuses
on the latter question—the issues of originalist theory that are raised by
judicial and scholarly debates over what is called “incorporation.”
Before we dig into substance of the debate, we need to do some initial
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clarifying work by answering the questions, “what is originalism?” and
“what is incorporation?”
A. What is Originalism?
The term “originalism” is itself disputed.1 Indeed, Thomas Colby and
Peter Smith claim to have demonstrated “that, despite the suggestion of
originalist rhetoric, originalism is not a single, coherent, unified theory
of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a disparate collection of
distinct constitutional theories that share little more than a misleading
reliance on a common label.”2 At the other end of the spectrum, Mitch
Berman claims that the term “Originalism” (with a capital “O”) should
be reserved for what he calls “Strong Originalism”—the view that the
original meaning of the constitution should be the exclusive (or almost
exclusive) determinant of constitutional meaning.3 Neither view is correct.
Originalism is best viewed as a family of theories that characteristically
affirm two theses:
The Fixation Thesis asserts that the linguistic meaning (or
semantic content) of each constitutional provision was fixed at
the time of origin (that is, the time at which each provision was
framed and ratified).
The Contribution Thesis asserts that the semantic content of
the Constitution contributes to the legal content of constitutional
doctrine:4 characteristically, originalists claim that constitutional
doctrine must be consistent with the “original meaning.”
Although almost all self-identified originalists affirm some version of
the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis, originalists have taken a

1. This Article utilizes many of the ideas that are developed in more depth and
detail in Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No.
07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
2. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
3. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009).
4. The phrase “constitutional doctrine” is used to refer to the content of
articulated constitutional norms (in the broad sense that includes principles, standards,
and rules in the narrow sense)—although doctrine might be limited to judicial doctrines,
I use that term to encompass constitutional norms both inside and outside the court. I use
the phrase “constitutional law” to encompass both “the Constitution” (the written document)
and constitutional doctrine, but by this usage, I do not mean to make any
metajurisprudential claims about the nature of law.
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variety of positions about the question as to what fixes original meaning
and why original meaning does or should contribute to and constrain
constitutional doctrine.
As to what fixes original meaning, originalist theory has evolved. In
the contemporary period, early originalist theory emphasized the “original
intentions of the framers.” Later originalists emphasized the “original
understandings of the ratifiers,” and then the “original public meaning”
of the constitutional text. Although the dominant strain of contemporary
originalism emphasizes “public meaning,” disagreement among originalists
persist—with Richard Kay,5 Larry Alexander,6 Sai Prakash,7 Steven
Smith,8 and others continuing to adhere to an intentionalist version of
originalism.9 The gap between internationalism and public meaning may
actually be quite narrow: because the relevant author of a constitution
(i.e., the framers or ratifiers) is likely to have semantic intentions that
point to public meanings, the conventional semantic meaning of the
constitution and the intended meaning are likely to converge in most or
even almost all cases.10
As to why original meaning should contribute to and constrain
constitutional doctrine, originalists have advanced a variety of positions
including:
Popular Sovereignty—some originalists have argued that the
original meaning should constrain constitutional interpretation
because the democratic legitimacy of the constitution derives
from its ratification by democratic procedures: it was the “original
meaning” that was authorized through such procedures.11

5. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009).
6. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You're Speaking?”
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 980–
81 (2004).
7. See id.
8. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 122-23, 125 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004).
9. See Lawrence B. Solum, 103 District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism,
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (summarizing the development of originalist theory). The case
against intentionalism is made in detail in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1.
10. Convergence will depend on the particular form of original-intentions originalism.
If the relevant intentions are “semantic intentions” (intentions concerning the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text), then the argument for convergence in text goes through.
But if the relevant intentional states are purposes, motives, or expectations, then originalintentions originalism and original-meaning originalism will diverge in a wide variety of
cases.
11. See Kurt Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis,
93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007). But see Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood
Relationship between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
485, 486 (2008).
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Writtenness—other constitutional theorists have argued that
the authority of the original meaning is entailed by the fact that
the Constitution is written: the point or purpose of writtenness
is to fix and constrain the content of constitutional doctrine.12
Supermajoritarianism—and still other originalists have
emphasized the notion that the original meaning of the Constitution
was adopted through supermajoritarian procedures that produce
legal rules with better consequences than legal rules that are not
adopted through such procedures.13
The Rule of Law—another argument for originalism emphasizes
the constraining force of fixed semantic content and the predictability,
certainty, and stability that such constraint fosters;14 the flip side
of this argument is the originalist critique of the discretion
conferred by constitutional practice that allows judges to engage
in constitutional practice that resorts to the judge’s own beliefs
about fundamental values.
Legal Practice—and finally, some originalists argue that the
conventions of legal practice recognize that the linguistic meaning
of the Constitution constrains officials who engage in constitutional
practice, including the Justices of the Supreme Court: fidelity to
law requires adherence to such practices absent the extraordinary
conditions that warrant official lawlessness.15
For the most part, this Article will operate within the framework of what
has been called “the New Originalism”16 or “original public meaning
originalism.” That is, the discussions of originalist theory will begin with
the assumption that the “original meaning of each constitutional

12. See generally Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional
Interpretation (Oct. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1281066) (discussing and criticizing argument from writtenness).
13. See John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,
TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=288344.
14. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 429 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With
Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005);
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994).
15. I argue for this conclusion in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1.
16. Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
599 (2004).
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provision” was fixed at the time of origin by conventional semantic
meaning of the words and phrases and by the conventions of syntax and
grammar at the time that the provision in question was framed and
ratified. But that starting assumption may be incomplete or partial. For
example, it is possible that the constitutional text includes “terms of art,”
words or phrases like “letters of marquee and reprisal” or “natural born
citizen” which lacked a “public meaning” for ordinary citizens but
which, via a division of linguistic labor, had a conventional semantic
meaning fixed by the usage of a linguistic subgroup (e.g., those learned
in the law).17
In addition, this Article adopts the distinction between “original meaning”
and “original applications” or “original expected applications.” The
phrase “original expected applications” originates with Jack Balkin,18
but Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman articulated a similar distinction
between “original meaning” and “original expectations” in their important
1998 article, The Meaning of Original Meaning.19 The point of the
distinction is that the linguistic meaning (or semantic content) of a text is
not the same as expectations about the application of that meaning to
future cases. Accepting this distinction does not imply that evidence
about expected applications is not relevant (epistemically) to the
determination of the conventional semantic meaning of the constitutional
text: expected applications of a text may offer evidence about its
meanings. Rather, the implication is that expectations about applications
are neither decisive evidence of meaning nor meaning itself.
Moreover, the version of originalist theory that serves as the baseline
for the discussion will embrace the distinction between “constitutional
interpretation,” understood as the enterprise of discerning the linguistic
meaning or semantic content of the Constitution, and “constitutional
construction,” which we might tentatively define as the activity of
further specifying constitutional rules when the original public meaning
of the text is vague or underdeterminate.20 This distinction explicitly

17. See Solum, supra note 1.
18. See Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY
291, 295–26 (2007); Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 448 (2008); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2007/07/clarence-thomass-originalism.html (July 11, 2007, 10:11 EST); Jack
Balkin, Alive and Kicking, YALE LAW SCHOOL, Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.law.yale.edu/
news/1846.htm; see also Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009).
19. Mark Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569, 573–74 (1998).
20. The distinction is strongly associated with Randy Barnett and Keith Whittington.
RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 88 (2004); KEITH WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1999); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
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acknowledges what we might call the fact of constitutional
underdeterminacy.21 The linguistic meaning of the Constitution does
not provide fully determinate answers to all the possible or actual questions
that could be or have been raised. Characteristically, originalist theory
asserts that the doctrines of constitutional law that are articulated to
resolve such underdeterminacies must be consistent with the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text, but stronger or weaker variations are
possible.
Finally, the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy that motivates the
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” can be clarified
by distinguishing between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.” The terms
“vague” and “ambiguous” are used in both precise and imprecise senses.
In loose talk, “vague” and “ambiguous” are sometimes treated as synonyms
or as different degrees of underdeterminacy.22 This Article will use the
terms “vague” and “ambiguous” in their strict (or philosophical) senses23
as articulated in the following definitions:
Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits
of borderline (or uncertain) cases.24

CONSTRUCTION 5 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 611–29 (1999). Another important early adopter of this distinction
(in the context of constitutional theory) was Robert Clinton. See Robert N. Clinton,
Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of ‘This Constitution’, 72
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987). For a brief introduction to the distinction, see Legal
Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal
_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-le.html (Feb. 8, 2009).
21. See Posting of Lawrence B. Solum to Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.
typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html (Oct. 30, 2007, 12:30). Cf. Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462,
473 (1987) (distinguishing determinacy, indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy).
22. Ambiguity is sometimes defined as having two senses: the first is “doubtful or
uncertain” and the second is “capable of being understood in two or more possible
senses.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ambiguous.
Vague is defined as unclear or imprecise. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.
m-w.com/dictionary/vague. Neither ordinary usage nor the dictionary definitions capture the
strict (or philosophical) senses of these terms.
23. See Legal Theory Lexicon 051: Vagueness and Ambiguity, http://lsolum.
typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html (Nov. 22, 2008).
24. A deeper account is offered in TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2000). Endicott identifies two marks of vagueness: (1) borderline
cases, (2) a tolerance principle, which states that “a tiny change in an object in a respect
relevant to the application of the expression cannot make the difference between the
expression's applying and not applying.” Id. at 31–33.
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Ambiguity: A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or
philosophical sense when it has more than one sense or meaning.25
The term “tall” is vague in the strict sense. Some people are definitely
short—Danny DeVito. Others definitely are tall—Shaquille O’Neal.
But the term “tall” is vague. 5’11 is almost definitely tall for a woman in
the United Sates, but it is probably a borderline case for men—Kurt
Russell (in real life) is neither definitely tall nor definitely not tall.
“Tall” is not the sort of quality for which there are definite criteria that
sort the world into “tall” things and “not tall” things. In other words,
“tall” is vague. “Cool,” on the other hand, is ambiguous, because it has
one sense related to temperature, another sense related to excitement and
emotion, and a third sense related to hipness and style.26 The same term
or phrase can be both vague and ambiguous: for example, when “cool”
is used to refer to temperature, it is vague, because there is no bright line
between warm and cool.
In sum, an originalist theory is a member of the family of theories of
constitutional interpretation that claims: (1) that the linguistic meaning
of each provision of the constitution was fixed at the time that provision
was framed and ratified, and (2) that the original meaning constrains
correct or legitimate constitutional practice. Originalist theories include
original intentions originalism and original public originalism, and these
theories have been justified by a variety of arguments, including
arguments that focus on popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Many
originalists distinguish constitutional interpretation (which recovers the
linguistic meaning of the text and resolves ambiguity) from constitutional
construction (which characteristically involves the determination of
constitutional doctrines and practices that deal with underdeterminacies
that result from the fact that many constitutional provisions are vague).
B. What is Incorporation?
Articulating the implications of originalist theory for incorporation
requires an understanding of “incorporation.” There is a widely shared
“rough and ready” understanding of incorporation—a provision of the
Bill of Rights is “incorporated” if that provision is applied to the states;
mutatis mutandus, such provisions are “not incorporated” if they are not

25. For discussions of ambiguity, see Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule
and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 178–87 (1995); Allan Farnsworth, “Dmeaning” in the Law
of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953–57 (1967); John T. Valauri, Confused Notions and
Constitutional Theory, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 567, 570-73 (1985).
26. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/cool.
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applied to the states. But this rough and ready understanding is imprecise
for at least two reasons. First, incorporation does not necessarily involve
the application of the semantic content of the first eight amendments to
the Constitution to the states. For example, the First Amendment begins
“Congress shall make no law . . . ,” but the incorporation debates are not
about the powers of Congress—they are about the application to the
states of the substance of “establishment,” “free exercise,” “freedom of
speech,” and so forth.27 The second reason that the rough and ready
formulation is imprecise is related to the first reason. Despite Barron v.
Baltimore,28 the Bill of Rights has always applied to the states. State
courts have always been bound by limitations of federal power in the
Bill of Rights. State legislatures have never had the power to authorize
Congress to infringe the freedom of speech; nor have state executives
ever had the power to enforce federal laws that would violate the
freedom of the press. The first and second reason both establish that the
incorporation debate is about application of the rights established by the
doctrines of constitutional law that are associated with the Bill of Rights
as limitations of state power that parallel the limitations these rights
impose on the federal government.
Both constitutional doctrine and theoretical debate about incorporation
have followed a tortuous path—with many twists and turns. In particular,
one aspect of the debate concerns the extent to which incorporation is
wholesale or selective. Is the entirety of the Bill of Rights to be applied
to the states? Or are some provisions to be included (freedom of speech)
and others omitted (the right to bear arms)? Another twist concerns the
content of the rights that are to be incorporated. If the “freedom of
speech” is incorporated, does this imply that the limitations on state
power are “identical” (in a loose sense of “identical”) to the limitations
on federal power imposed by the First Amendment? Or does incorporation
only require that some subset of these limitations be imposed on the
states—perhaps the “core”?
C. Narrowing the Scope of Inquiry to Privileges or Immunities
The general topic at hand is investigation of the implications of
27. Michael Kent Curtis articulates this point in terms of the distinction between
rights and security devices. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States:
An Overview From One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009).
28. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833).
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originalist theory for debates about incorporation of the Bill of Rights
via the Fourteenth Amendment. In theory such incorporation might be
accomplished via “equal protection,” “due process,” or “privileges
or immunities.” And in practice, the focus of current constitutional doctrine
has been on the due process clause. For the purposes of this Article,
however, discussion will focus on the privileges or immunities clause of
Section One.
This is only an assumption. This Article does not claim that something
like incorporation could not be justified by originalist interpretation of
the due process clause or the equal protection clause. Perhaps, “due
process of law” implies that the “law” reflected in the Bill of Rights is
“due,” or perhaps the rights established in the first eight amendments are
components of “liberty” that the due process clause protects. These
possibilities will simply be set aside, and this Article will proceed on the
assumption that the due process clause is limited to what we call
“procedural due process.” Likewise, it is possible that the phrase “equal
protection of the laws” includes “protection by the rights established in
the “laws” set forth in the Bill of Rights.” Once again, I shall simply assume
that the equal protection clause is either concerned with substantive
equality (the conventional understanding embodied in modern doctrine)
or with the equal enforcement of the legal rights of all persons (as an
originalist might argue).
Incorporation under the privileges or immunities clause might have
important practical consequences. The due process and equal protection
clauses apply to all “persons” whereas the privileges or immunities
clause applies only to “citizens of the United States.” So, if the Supreme
Court were to transfer the basis of incorporation to the latter clause, the
structure of legal rights of noncitizens would be changed in various
ways. This practical question is surely important, but it will not receive
further attention in this article.29
If we set aside the due process and equal protection clauses, we are
left with the privileges or immunities clause:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
Thus, a first take on our question could be framed as follows: are the
substantive rights (freedom of speech, free exercise, the right to keep
and bear arms) set out in the Bill of Rights “privileges or immunities
citizens of the United States” given the conventional semantic meaning
of that phrase (or its constituent elements) at the time of the framing and

29.

418

See Solum, supra note 1.

INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC

[VOL. 18: 409, 2009]

1/20/10 12:36 PM

Incorporation and Originalist Theory
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES.

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment?
D. Roadmap
With our question now defined, the remainder of this Article will
proceed as follows. Part II examines the theoretical framework for an
investigation of incorporation that operates within the narrow confines
of interpretation of the text based on the assumption that the original
meaning of the text is solely determined by the public meaning for
ordinary citizens at the time of framing and ratification. Part III relaxes
the assumption that “original meaning” is determined solely by the
linguistic practices of the whole community and considers the possibility
that the phrase “privileges or immunities” was a term of art with a
technical meaning for those learned in the law. Part IV relaxes the
assumption that the incorporation debate must be resolved solely by
interpretation and considers the possibility that incorporation doctrine
might be viewed as a construction of an underdeterminate constitutional
text. Part V considers the implications of the possibility that the “privileges
or immunities clause” instantiates what might be called a failure of
constitutional communication. Part VI concludes.
II. PUBLIC MEANING OF “THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS
OF THE UNITED STATES” FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS
This Article is about the relationship of originalist theory to the
incorporation debate. The point of the Article is to pinpoint the
theoretical assumptions that are implicit in various moves that are (or
could be) made by those who advocate or oppose incorporation on
originalist grounds. In order to lay bare the theoretical bones, the
assumptions of originalist theory will be articulated as carefully defined
assumptions. The aim is to isolate the effect of the various elements of
(and options for) originalist theory. That isolation begins with two
assumptions—about “public meaning” and “interpretation.”
A. Two Assumptions
This Part is predicated on two assumptions (which are relaxed in
subsequent Parts of this Article): first, that original meaning is limited to
public meaning for “ordinary citizens,” and second, that incorporation
must be justified on the basis of interpretation without the aid of
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construction. Each of these assumptions requires further explanation.
1. Assumption One: “Original Meaning” Is Public
Meaning for Ordinary Citizens
The first assumption is that “original meaning” should be understood
as meaning for the public at large or for “ordinary citizens.” This assumption
is explicit in the following passage from the majority opinion in District
of Columbia v. Heller:
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931); see
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Normal meaning
may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding
generation.30

In this passage, Justice Scalia distinguishes between “idiomatic meaning”
and “technical meanings.” The notion of an idiom is based on the fact a
phrase in a natural language such as English can have a meaning that is
not identical to the meaning that would be derived from the individual
words and the rules of grammar and syntax via the principle of
compositionality. A “nest egg” is not an egg in a nest. Someone who
“kicks the bucket” is dead—and most definitely not “alive and kicking.”
Heller allows for the idiomatic meanings, but it rejects “technical
meanings” “that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation.”
Underlying this assumption are further assumptions about patterns of
linguistic practice. Ordinary citizens participate in a general community
of language users. Not every citizen knows the meaning of every word
or phrase that has what Heller calls “normal meaning”—but for a
meaning to be “normal” it must be widely dispersed culturally (among
various social and occupational groups) and geographically in the
relevant community (defined by the territory of the United States).31
“Technical meanings” are shared by linguistic subgroups, e.g. lawyers,
doctors, or seamen, whose linguistic communities have distinctive patterns
of usage that are not shared by the general community of language users.
For the purposes of this Part, we shall assume that the original

30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
31. The explanation in text is not intended as an adequate theory of “normal
meaning”: it is a gesture or “hand wave” in the direction of a more fully developed
account. “Normal meaning” is Justice Scalia’s term. Scalia’s terminology plays no role
in the theory I develop in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1.
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meaning of the privileges or immunities clause is the conventional
semantic meaning of the phrase “the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States” for the community of competent English speakers
who occupied the territory of the United States.
2. Assumption Two: Incorporation Must Be Justified by
Interpretation Without the Aid of Construction
Recall that the interpretation-construction distinction differentiates
two distinct modes or moments in the application of the constitutional
text to a particular case or controversy. Constitutional interpretation discovers
the linguistic meaning or semantic context of the text. Constitutional
construction translates that meaning into constitutional doctrines that are
sufficiently determinate to resolve particular cases. In some cases,
construction is automatic—the constitutional text assigns two Senators
to each state and this content of the corresponding rule of constitutional
doctrine is identical to the linguistic meaning of the text in all but the
most unusual circumstances. But in other cases, the linguistic meaning
may be vague. For example, the phrases “legislative power,” “executive
power,” and “judicial power” may have a core of determinate meaning
but admit of borderline cases that require a rule of construction to
resolve particular questions.
For the purposes of this Part, we shall operate on the assumption that
the question whether the privileges or immunities clause authorizes
incorporation should be answered in the affirmative if and only if
incorporation is required by constitutional interpretation—that is, by the
linguistic meaning of the clause without supplementation by constitutional
construction.
B. How Could Incorporation Be Justified as an Interpretation
Based on “Public Meaning” for Ordinary Citizens?
Much of the discussion surrounding incorporation and the privileges
or immunities clause is framed in intentionalist terms. Did the framers
(or ratifiers) of the Fourteenth intend to incorporate the Bill of Rights?
Was that their purpose? Did they expect that incorporation would
follow from adoptions of the Fourteenth? Given the two assumptions
that control the discussion in this Part, the answers to those questions
can only provide indirect evidence that bears on the main question—
what was the conventional semantic meaning (or “normal meaning”) of
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the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” for
ordinary citizens?
To begin, it is obvious that the privileges or immunities clause does
not directly and unambiguously state that the states may not violate the
rights of citizens that are contained in the Bill of Rights. That could
have been said in various ways. Each provision of the Bill of Rights
could have been repeated with an appropriate adjustment: for example,
“No state shall violate the free exercise of religion or infringe the freedom
of speech.” Or the clause could have read, “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States as defined by the first eight amendments to
this Constitution.”
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the privileges and immunities
clause should be read as having semantic content that is functionally
equivalent to a direct and unambiguous statement of incorporation.
Consider the following passage from Michael Kent Curtis’s Article for
this conference:
According to Felix Frankfurter (concurring in Adamson v. California and
citing Justice Holmes), “an amendment to the Constitution should be read in a
‘sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption. . . .
For it was for public adoption that it was proposed.’” What follows is a
common, natural, and direct reading of the privileges or immunities clause:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge [reduce in
scope or diminish] the privileges [rights] or immunities of [shared by and
secured to] citizens of the United States.
Of course, the security was incomplete, as Barron v. Baltimore established. That
is why the additional “no state shall” security was needed. One logical place to
look for rights of citizens of the United States would be the rights set out in the
Constitution. The major group of rights listed is those liberties in the Bill of
Rights. There are a number of others such as habeas corpus. Does the Bill of
Rights contain rights? We do describe it as a “Bill of Rights.” The rights are
declared to exist, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. However, as the
Supreme Court ruled in Barron, the rights are secured only against federal
invasion.32

The key premise in Curtis’s argument is that the words “privilege” and
“immunity” were used as synonyms for the words “right” and “liberty,”
and that the rights conferred in the Bill of Rights were described as
“privileges” and “immunities” in ordinary usage in the periods before, during,
and after the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Much of the evidence is provided in other work by Curtis that is cited in
his paper for this conference.33
32. Curtis, supra note 27.
33. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after
Death: The Privileges or Immunities Of Citizens Of The United States, 78 N.C. L. Rev.
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Let us assume that Curtis is right about linguistic practice in the
relevant period, and that the rights conferred by the Bill of Rights would
have been understood as “privileges” and “immunities” as well as “rights”
and “liberties.” (For the record, let me state that based on my reading of
Curtis and other secondary literature, but not the original sources, I am
provisionally persuaded by Curtis on this point.) Would this make the
case for incorporation given the two assumptions (public meaning only
and interpretation solely)? That question takes us to the problems of
exclusion and inclusion.
C. The Problems of Exclusion and Inclusion
If we assume that the phrase “privileges or immunities” is the
equivalent of “rights or liberties” or more simply “rights,” does this
imply that the privilege or immunities clause incorporates the “rights” in
the Bill of Rights? The problem with answering this question is that we
need first to solve problems of exclusion and inclusion—what rights are
included and what rights are excluded. The semantic content of the clause
is sufficient, by itself, to support the conclusion that at least some rights
must be included—otherwise the clause would be without legal effect.
One possible reading of the clause is that “all rights” are protected—this
might flow from the use of the definite article “the” preceding “privileges or
immunities.” The use of the definite article “the” and the preposition “of”
may imply that the rule of inclusion is existence—all rights that citizens
have are included: the corresponding rule of exclusion is nonexistence—
rights that citizens do not possess are excluded.34
But this immediately leads to another question, what kind of rights?
This question will quickly lead us into deep waters and myriad possibilities.
On this occasion, I will evade my responsibility for “doing the right
thing” by investigating all of the possibilities and their merits and instead I
shall merely assume that there are only three relevant possibilities. The
concept of right is ambiguous as between two kinds: legal rights (the
rights conferred by law) and moral rights (the rights that citizens have a

1071, 1091 (2000). This article is essential reading for anyone researching the original
meaning of the privileges or immunities clause.
34. The definite article “the” implies that the thing referred to is a particular thing:
the function of the definite article is to particularize. So the phrase “the privileges or
immunities” has a different meaning than would the phrase “some privileges or immunities”
or the phrase “a privilege or immunity.”
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matter of political morality—alternatively we could use the terminology
“natural rights”). Thus, “privileges” or “immunities” might refer to:
(1) legal rights only, (2) moral rights only, or (3) both moral and legal
rights.
For the moment, let us assume (as Curtis seems to assume) that the
Fourteenth Amendment refers only to legal rights. (Notice that this
assumption leaves open the possibilities that legal rights are justified by
reference to moral rights or that the two categories are extensionally
equivalent or nearly equivalent.) The assumption that privileges or
immunities are legal rights then yields the conclusion that the privileges
or immunities clause encompasses all of the legal rights that citizens
actually possess, including but not limited to the rights contained in the
Bill of Rights.
That conclusion would be troubling for obvious reasons. It would
entail the conclusion that the privileges or immunities clause conferred
constitutional status (as against the states) on all the legal rights
possessed by citizens, including for example, all of the rights under state
law including the provisions of contracts, wills, trusts, and so forth.
There is much more to be said about this possibility, but at this point we
can merely observe that this interpretation of the privileges or
immunities clause is very broad and might even count as “absurd”—
although much would need to be said to show that was so.
If moral rights were included, the implications would be even more
disturbing. If all moral rights were protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, then the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the
states from doing anything that violated any justified moral claim of any
citizen. Because lawmaking is state action, the implication is that every
state law would be subject to a “morality” test—federalizing the regulation
of almost every aspect of human conduct.
D. The Meaning of “Of”
But there is more text! The relevant phrase is “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.” What does it mean for a
right to be a right of citizens of the United States? There are at least
three possibilities—although there may be more.
1. Privileges or Immunities that Any Citizen of the United States
Happens to Possess: The All-rights Interpretation
The first possibility is that the word “of” limits “privileges or
immunities” to those rights that any citizen of the United States happens
to possess. In the immediately prior section, we discussed the problems
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that this reading creates. Because it results in the constitutionalization of
all legal rights possessed by any citizen of the United States, any time
any state acted in a way that modified or extinguished a legal and/or
moral right, there would potentially be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This reading seems implausible.
2. Privileges or Immunities that Citizens Possess by Virtue of the
National Citizenship: The In-Virtue-Of Interpretation
A second possibility is that for a right to be a privilege or immunity of
citizens of the United States, the right must be a right that the citizen
possesses qua (or in virtue of) United States Citizenship. That is, the
right must be a right that the person does possess because the person is a
citizen and that the person would not possess if the person were not a
citizen. Rights that are limited to citizens would be included, and rights
that are not limited to citizens would not be included. This rule would
result in the exclusion of a variety of rights conferred by state and
federal law on citizens and noncitizens alike. For example, it would
exclude various common law rights and rights created by contracts,
trusts, and the like. It would also exclude a variety of statutory rights,
both state and federal—such as the rights conferred by copyright, patent,
and trademark statutes (because these rights do not depend on one’s
status as a citizen).
How would this principle operate with respect to the Bill of Rights?
Some of the rights that are included in the Bill of Rights may be limited
to United States Citizens. For example, the Second Amendment recognizes
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” and arguably “the
people” refers to citizenry rather than all persons: a similar observation
could be made about the right of assembly in the First Amendment. But
other provisions of the Bill of Rights are not limited in this way. The Third
Amendment extends protection to “owners” and the Fifth Amendment to
“persons.” The Sixth Amendment applies to the “accused,” and the Seventh
and Eighth Amendments do not limit their coverage to “citizens.” Moreover,
neither the word “citizen” nor the phrase “citizens of the United States”
appears in the Bill of Rights.
I should now state the obvious. Limiting privileges or immunities to
those rights that are possessed by citizens of the United States qua their
status as national citizens results in an extremely narrow set of privileges
or immunities. Indeed, a variation of this reading was adopted in the
Slaughterhouse Cases—which are sometimes characterized as judicial
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nullification of the privileges or immunities clause.
3. Privileges or Immunities that are Shared by Citizens of the United
States: The Shared-Rights Interpretation
There is, however, a third interpretation of the phrase “of citizens of
the United States.” Recall that we are assuming that the relevant rights
are legal rights. The locution “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” might have been understood as referring to those rights
that are shared by citizens of the United States. Thus, “No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privilege or immunity
of a citizen of the United States” might have a different meaning than
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” The former
expression could refer to the set of rights that results from adding the
sets of legal rights that attach to each and every individual citizen. The
later expression could refer to the set of rights that results from
identifying the common members of the sets of legal rights that belong
to individual citizens.
On the shared rights interpretation, the set of privileges or immunities
is large, but it falls far short of all legal rights. For example, the right to
own property and make contracts might have been shared by all citizens
of the United States, but the right of particular persons in particular
property or the rights conferred by a particular contract would not be
shared. A core set of common law rights would have been shared by
all35 citizens, but to the extent that state law differed on the details of
contract, tort, or property law, the zone of variation would be outside the
set of shared rights.
The shared rights interpretation would seem to sanction incorporation
of the Bill of Rights: all of the substantive rights protected by the Bill of
Rights were shared by citizens of the United States.
4. Resolving the Ambiguity Regarding the Meaning of “Of”
Can the ambiguity regarding the meaning of “of” be resolved by
original public meaning originalism—given the two assumptions (meaning
to ordinary citizens only and interpretation solely)? That is surely a
difficult question, and it is not the purpose of this Article to answer such
questions. Theoretically, the method of approach would begin with an

35. “All” should probably be read as “almost” all, or perhaps “all” adult citizens
who do not suffer from a legal disability, such as mental incapacity or conviction of a
crime that results in a loss of rights otherwise available to adult competent citizens.
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investigation of linguistic practice. For example, it might be the case
that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
had acquired a quasi-idiomatic meaning: one of the three senses
(“possessed by any,” “in virtue of,” or “shared by all”) might be the
standard meaning of the phrase. (This possibility seems very unlikely to
me.) Or it might be the case that linguistic practice in the eighteenth
century ruled out one of the possible senses identified here. (Again, this
seems unlikely to me, but this is idle speculation without an examination
of a massive amount of evidence.)
Originalist theory might allow for another route to the resolution of the
ambiguity. Frequently, ambiguities in the linguistic meaning or semantic
content of an utterance can be resolved by examining the context of
utterance. In a given context, it may be clear that one of the possible
senses of an utterance could not have been the sense in which the phrase
would have been understood by competent speakers of English. That is,
some senses of an ambiguous expression may become “absurd” in
context. Given the theoretical commitments of original public meaning
originalism, the relevant context would be what I have called “the
publicly available context of constitutional utterance”—those features of
the context of framing and ratification that would have been known to
public at large at time of origin. Thus, if the constitutionalization of all
legal rights would have been viewed as absurd, that reading of “of”
might be ruled out. For example, the first sense of “of” identified above,
the all-rights interpretation, might well have been considered absurd.
Given the disagreement over the Slaughterhouse Cases, however, it may
well be the case that neither the “in virtue of” nor the “shared by all”
senses would have been viewed as absurd.
What does originalist theory prescribe in this situation? Again, the
issue is complex and an adequate analysis would require an extended
investigation. I believe that in the end, there are cases of what might be
called “irreducible ambiguity.” That is, there are cases when the original
public meaning of a constitutional provision is ambiguous—even after
the publicly available context of constitutional utterance is taken into
account. As is the case with vagueness, this kind of ambiguity is not
tantamount to indeterminacy. Originalist method might narrow the
possibilities without fully resolving the question. At this point, the discovery
of linguistic meaning has done all the work it can do. Interpretation
exits the stage, and something else, constitutional construction, makes its
entrance.
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If it were the case that the ambiguity between “in virtue of” and
“shared by all” could not be resolved by interpretation, then our answer
to the main question of this Part would be “negative.” Given an ambiguity
that cannot be resolved by interpretation and the assumption that
interpretation must do all the work, originalist theory would suggest
that the incorporation question is “undecidable”36 in something like the
formal sense of that term. Given our two assumptions (public meaning
only and interpretation solely), incorporation could not be justified on
originalist grounds.
E. The Assumptions Revisited
But what if we were to relax one or both of these assumptions? In the
next Part of this Article, we shall examine the possibility that “public
meaning originalism” could allow for technical meanings or terms of art.
In the following Part, we shall consider the implications of constitutional
construction for circumstances in which the linguistic meaning of the
text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous.
III. “PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES” AS A TERM OF ART
The phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
might have been understood as “common parlance”—as having a
meaning that is determined by the shared linguistic conventions of the
linguistic community of speakers of American English in the midNineteenth Century. But what if this were not the case? What if “privileges”
and “immunities”37 were terms of art, with a technical meaning that
36. See Undecidable, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable.
37. It is possible that the larger phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” had idiomatic or technical meaning as a whole phrase. Whether or not
this was the case depends on the evidence, but there is evidence of usage of the whole
phrase. For example, in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 451–52 (1805),
lawyers for residents of the District of Colmbia argued: “It is true that the citizens of
Columbia are not entitled to the elective franchise in as full a manner as the citizens of
states. They have no vote in the choice of president, vice president, senators and
representatives in congress. . . . But in every other respect the citizens of Columbia are
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.” And in
1835, Benjamin Butler, the Attorney General under Andrew Jackson, responded to
efforts in Arkansas to organize proceedings to seek statehood:
No law has yet been passed by Congress which either expressly or impliedly
gives to the people of Arkansas the authority to form a State government. . . .
But I am not prepared to say that all proceedings on this subject on the part of
the citizens of Arkansas will be illegal. They undoubtedly possess the ordinary
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Among these is the
right of the people "peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for the
redress of grievances." In the exercise of this right, the inhabitants of Arkansas
may peaceably meet together in primary assemblies, or conventions chosen by
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would have been fully grasped by a linguistic subgroup (those learned in
the law), but not fully understood by ordinary citizens? This Part
addresses these questions in three stages: first, by considering the
significance of technical meanings as a matter of originalist theory;
second, by examining two candidates for the technical meaning of
“privileges or immunities”; and third, by examining the implications of a
technical meaning for the incorporation debate.
A. The Division of Linguistic Labor
How can originalists respond to the problem of constitutional terms of
art—the use of “technical meanings”? How can “original public meaning
originalism” embrace the idea that some of the provisions of the
constitution might not have had “public meanings”? In approaching this
question, it is important to recall that originalism is committed to
recovery of the originalist linguistic meaning of the constitutional
text. Linguistic meanings are determined by linguistic facts—and not
by normative theories. The determination whether a given constitutional
provision employed a technical meaning or term of art does not depend
on our views of popular sovereignty or our beliefs about constitutional
legitimacy. For example, if the phrase “letters of marquee and reprisal”
was a term of art in late Eighteenth Century linguistic practice, then the
semantic content of that phrase is given by its technical meaning—even
if our beliefs about popular sovereignty lead us the conclusion that it

such assemblies, for the purpose of petitioning Congress to abrogate the
Territorial government, and to admit them into the Union as an independent state.
Right of the Territories to Become States, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 726, 732–33 (1835). And
President Jackson himself also used the whole phrase:
In the organization of the present temporary government, and its execution, I
have steadily in few the securing to the inhabitants of the Floridas all the
privileges and immunities guaranteed to them by the treaty.
The principle of these is the protection of their persons, property, and religion,
until they shall be incorporated into the union, and become entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
PHILO ASHLEY GOODWIN, BIOGRAPHY OF ANDREW JACKSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FORMERLY MAJOR GENERAL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES 257 (1835),
available at http://www.google.com/books?id=nHkEAAAAYAAJ.
In this Article, the aim is not to resolve this question, but rather to elucidate its
theoretical dimension. If the whole phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States” had an idiomatic or technical meaning at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, then that meaning would be the relevant original public
meaning for the purposes of originalist theory.
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would have been preferable for the framers to have employed a
nontechnical term.
The solution to the problem of technical meanings is to recognize a
division of linguistic labor.38 The intuitive idea is simple. When members
of the general public encounter a constitutional term of art, their
understanding of its meaning can be described as involving a process of
deferral. Consider the following example. An ordinary citizen reads the
phrase “letters of marquee and reprisal,” and thinks, “Hmm. I wonder
what that means. It sounds like technical legal language to me. If I want
to know what it means, I should probably ask a lawyer or maybe a
judge.” That is, ordinary citizens would recognize a division of linguistic
labor and defer to the understanding of the term of art that would be the
publicly available meaning to those who were members of the relevant
group and those who shared the understandings of the members of the
relevant group. Blackstone put it this way: terms of art “must be taken
according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and
science.”39
The technical meaning is (in a special sense) still a “public meaning.”
Given the division of linguistic labor, it is possible for ordinary citizens
to recognize the meaningfulness of a term of art—even though they
cannot themselves articulate even an approximate version of the criteria
for correct application of the term. For example, we might say that the
term “quark” has a public meaning, roughly “some sort of elementary
particle that is defined by physics,” even though very few members of
the public could give a rough paraphrase of the definition or distinguish
quarks from neutrinos.40
This solution to the problem of technical meanings requires either that
each constitutional term of art refer us to a single group, or to a group of
groups that share the same understanding of the term of art. For example, if
both sailors and lawyers shared the same understanding of “letters of
marquee and reprisal” then constitutional communication could succeed.
If different groups had different understandings of the same phrase,
constitutional communication could still succeed, assuming the publicly

38. The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually attributed to Hilary Putnam.
See Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning' in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOL. 2: MIND,
LANGUAGE AND REALITY 227 (1985); see also Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic
Labor and Speaker Competence, 34 PHIL. STUD. 37, 37 (1978); Mark Greenberg,
Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought (UCLA Sch. of Law
Research Paper No. 07-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030144.
39. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *59 (W.S.
Hein & Co. reprint 1992) (1768).
40. Compare Quark, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark with Neutrino,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutrino.
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available context of constitutional utterance allowed resolution of the
resulting ambiguity. For example, if the publicly available context of
constitutional utterance made it clear that the relevant sense of “letters of
marquee and reprisal” was the legal sense, then the linguistic practices of
lawyers (and not of sailors) would determine the relevant meaning of the
term.
At this point, it might be argued that allowing for constitutional terms
of art is inconsistent with popular sovereignty as a normative justification
for originalism. Full consideration of that argument is itself a large topic
deserving of extended treatment, but on this occasion I can only offer a few
brief remarks.
First, it is not clear that the deployment of constitutional terms of art is
inconsistent with popular sovereignty. Reconciliation might occur
via several routes. For example, it might be argued that democratic
legitimacy requires only that the term of art be publicly accessible
through reasonable effort. Most participants in the ratification process
might rely on the fact that a few participants have ascertained that the
technical meaning did not conceal a secret meaning that would not have
survived full public disclosure: this seems especially plausible with
respect to complex provisions with limited effects. Or it might be
argued that the Constitution as a whole can retain democratic legitimacy
even if there are particular provisions that lack public meanings.
Second, it is not clear that popular sovereignty theory provides the
best or only justification for originalism. It might be the case that
adherence to original meaning is justified by rule of law concerns—even
if an important constitutional provision were undemocratic because of its
use of technical language. Third, even if popular sovereignty theory
warranted the judicial nullification of the original linguistic meaning of a
technical term in the Constitution, it might nonetheless be important to
understand what meaning was being rejected. The actual linguistic meaning
of the provision might, for example, be relevant to the construction of an
artificial “public meaning” for the purposes of articulating constitutional
doctrine.
B. “Privileges or Immunities” as a Term of Art
Once again, this Article makes no claims about the original meaning
of the privileges or immunities clause. On this occasion, the aim is
simply to explicate the implications of originalist theory for such claims.
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to examine some of the possible
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“technical meanings” in order to make the explication of abstract theory
both clearer and more determinant.
1. Corfield v. Coryell
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a
variety of references of Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in
Corfield v. Coryell,41 a Circuit Court opinion interpreting the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV. That clause provides:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.42
Corfield offered the following gloss on the meaning of the phrase
“privileges and immunities”:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
be exercised.43

This passage suggests that the “privileges and immunities” of Article IV
are a subset of the general class of all privileges and immunities—those
which are “fundamental,” “belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments,” and “have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of
the several states.” It then offers a list of particular rights that are
included in the list.
From the perspective of originalist theory, it is not clear what is going

41.
42.
43.
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on in Corfield. There opinion does not define the relevant terms
(“privilege” and “immunity”). Instead, it assumes that the phrase “privileges
and immunities” is understood, and then suggests that the relevant subset
contains only those privileges and immunities that are “in their nature
fundamental.” This move might be justified on the ground that only the
fundamental privileges and immunities are privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states. Or this might be considered a narrowing
construction of a constitutional provision that otherwise would be
impracticably broad. But whatever the rationale of Corfield, it might be
argued that the Corfield gloss established a technical meaning for the
phrase “privileges and immunities” that would have been recognized as
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or immunities”
clause by those learned in the law at the time of its framing and
ratification.
Something more needs to be said about the possibility that Corfield
established a technical legal meaning for “privileges” and “immunities.”
To simplify, we can imagine a four-stage sequence by which the phrase
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” acquired its
“original linguistic meaning.” At stage one, we have the conventional
semantic meaning of the “privileges and immunities” clause of Article
IV. This meaning is simply the meaning of the individual words and
phrases as combined by the rules of grammar and syntax at the time the
original constitution was framed and ratified. At stage two, the “privileges
or immunities clause” of Article IV is given an authoritative construction
by the Supreme Court in Corfield. At stage three, that authoritative
construction is absorbed by the linguistic subcommunity that consists of
those learned in the law (lawyers, judges, and others), resulting in the
words “privilege” and “immunity” acquiring a new technical meaning in
legal discourse. At stage four, that technical meaning is assumed in the
framing, ratification, and subsequent interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The result is that the terms “privilege” and “immunity” had
one linguistic meaning at the time Article IV was framed and ratified, and a
different, but related meaning at the time the same words were used in
the Fourteenth Amendment.
On this view, the terms “privileges” and “immunities” when used
in appropriate contexts—including discussions of constitutional law—
would be terms of legal art or more particularly terms of art in American
constitutional law. Ordinary citizens might not be able to produce
anything like the Corfield gloss if asked for the meaning of the phrase,
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but they might recognize that technical language was being employed.
On this view, “privileges” and “immunities” are like “quarks”: ordinary
citizens may not be able to define them, but they recognize that they
have technical meanings that are understood by experts.
2. Blackstone
There are other indications that the words “privileges” and “immunities”
might have had technical meanings, even before the words were used in
Article IV. In his Commentaries, Blackstone used the terms “privilege”
and “immunity” as terns of art in the theory of the common law:
Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights themselves
thus defined by [Magna Carta and other foundational] statutes, consist in a
number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised,
to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else
those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the
natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were formerly, by
inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in most other countries
of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may
be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people
of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles;
the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty; and the right of
private property: because as there is no other known method of compulsion, or
of abridging man’s natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of
one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may
justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their
largest and most extensive sense.44

Blackstone used the term “immunities” to describe what we would call
“natural rights” or “rights of political morality.” His concept of “privileges”
or “civil privileges” corresponds to the modern notion of a legal right.
Blackstone’s Commentaries and various American editions thereof
certainly constituted part of the technical knowledge of those learned in
the law in the Nineteenth Century. It might be argued that Blackstone’s
usage—equating immunities with natural rights and privileges with legal
rights that substituted for (or protected) natural rights—either created or
was evidence of common law terms of art that provided the relevant
technical sense for these terms in Article IV and subsequently the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although Bushrod Washington’s formulation in Corfield v. Coryell is
not identical to Blackstone’s, it is possible that these definitions can be

44. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *128–29 (emphasis added); see also Eric R.
Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States
Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegen, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 781–82, 784
(2008).

434

INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC

[VOL. 18: 409, 2009]

1/20/10 12:36 PM

Incorporation and Originalist Theory
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES.

reconciled. Corfield doesn’t define “privilege” or “immunity”—it assumes
some prior or already understood definition or usage. The use of
“fundamental” in Corfield could be reconciled with the notion of “natural
liberty” in Blackstone. Corfield’s list of privileges or immunities begins
with “Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind” which seems
to echo Blackstone’s three categories: “the right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty; and the right of private property.”
C. The Implications for Incorporation
Assuming arguendo that the “privileges or immunities” clause had a
technical meaning along the lines suggested by Blackstone and/or
Corfield, what would be the implications for the incorporation debates?
The most obvious implication is that the specific list of rights contained
in the Bill of Rights would have no special per se status as privileges or
immunities. That is not to say that these rights would not qualify as “natural
liberties” or as “fundamental.” But it would suggest that inclusion in the
Bill of Rights would not automatically qualify a given right as a privilege or
immunity of citizens of the United States. Inclusion of a right in the Bill
of Rights might, however, be relevant (epistemically) to the inquiry as to
whether the right was “fundamental” or a “civil privilege” that protected an
underlying “natural liberty.” The fact that the framers of the Bill of Rights
included a particular right in the Bill of Rights is evidence that they
considered the right to be fundamental, and their opinions about this
matter might affect our deliberations. At a minimum, the inclusion of a
right in the Bill of Rights might create a presumption (even if it were
only a “bursting bubble”) in favor of inclusion of the right. At a maximum,
we might accord the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
epistemic authority over this question, concluding that our deliberations
about the question whether these rights were truly fundamental would be
more likely to issue in correct outcomes if we deferred to their opinions.
Of course, it would not follow from this that the Bill of Rights would
constitute an exhaustive list of the “privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.” Other rights might be included as well—including
general rights to acquire, own, and alienate private property, to form and
enforce contracts, to the protection of the state against violence, to selfdefense, and so forth. Further complications become apparent at this stage
of the analysis. Suppose, for example, that the technical meaning of
immunity was “natural right” and of privilege “a legal right that protects or
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substitutes for a natural right.” What then are “natural rights” (or “natural
liberties” to use Blackstone’s phrase)? What are the implications for
originalist theory if we believe that Eighteenth Century understandings
of natural or fundamental rights were in error? Or what if we conclude
that the idea of a “natural right” is simply a mistake—that there are no
real or actual entities that correspond to the eighteenth century
conception of a natural right? Should judges then resort to a “saving” or
“mending” construction of the relevant provision? Some of these
questions will be discussed in Part V below, but at this stage, we return
to the assumption made in Part II above, that the question of incorporation
must be addressed by constitutional interpretation without the aid of
constructions.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
In Part II, we assumed (for the purposes of clarity and precision in
exposition) that the implications of originalist theory for incorporation
could be addressed solely as a matter of constitutional interpretation.
That is, we assumed that the relevant question was whether the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text either required or forbade incorporation.
Although that assumption is useful for the purpose of this Article—
exploration of the interaction of incorporation with originalist theory—it
may obscure rather than illuminate the substance of the incorporation
debate. This would be the case, for example, if the text underdetermines
the answer to the question whether the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights are among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. In this Part, we investigate the implications of constitutional
construction for the question whether the privileges and immunities clause
supports incorporations.
We can begin by revisiting the interpretation-construction distinction,
and then proceed to consider its implications for incorporation.
A. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction Revisited
What is the difference between “constitutional interpretation” and
“constitutional construction?”45 Absent a thorough familiarity with the
history of the law of contracts, trusts, or wills, or a deep knowledge of
contemporary constitutional theory, some readers may assume that these
45. See generally Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On Parol: The Construction
and Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in Contract
Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 661–63 (1997); Note, Choice of Law Rules for the
Construction and Interpretation of Written Instruments, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155–
56 (1959).
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two terms are synonyms. Many authors use “interpretation” and
“construction” more or less interchangeably.46 In fact, the distinction
between interpretation of the linguistic meaning of legal texts and the
construction of legal rules from that linguistic meaning has a long
history in Anglo-American law.47 Elaborating on the very tentative
formulation offered above,48 we might use the following definitions:
Interpretation: The activity of determining the linguistic meaning—
or semantic content—of a legal text.
Construction: The activity of translating the semantic content
of a legal text into legal rules, paradigmatically in cases where the
meaning of the text is vague.
We interpret the meaning of a text, and then we construct legal rules to
help us apply that linguistic meaning to particular fact situations.
Courts and legal theorists have deployed the distinction between
interpretation and construction in a variety of legal contexts, including
contract law. In a contracts case, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court
stated, “Interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of contractual
words; construction refers to deciding their legal effect.”49
We have already noted the connection between the interpretationconstruction distinction and the vagueness-ambiguity distinction.
Characteristically, interpretation resolves ambiguity and construction
creates subsidiary rules that resolve vagueness. In most cases, interpretation
resolves ambiguity because usually there is a linguistic fact of the matter
about the semantic meaning of a text given the context of utterance:
words that are ambiguous without context usually become unambiguous
once the context of utterance is considered. This fact is a simple

46. See, e.g., Michael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How
Should a Statute be Read? When is it Subject to Interpretation? What our Courts Say
and What they Do, 2004 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 89 n.22 (2004) (““Interpretation” and
“construction” will be treated as synonyms in this paper.”); BRYAN A. GARNER, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 462 (2nd Ed. 1995); Gary E. O'Connor,
Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 335
n.5 (2004) (“This article treats the terms “statutory interpretation” and “statutory
construction” as interchangeable synonyms.”).
47. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 11, 44 (1880), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=tE4uAAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=lieber+legal
+hermeneutics.
48. See supra text accompanying note 20.
49. Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Inv. Corp., 266 N.W. 2d 22, 25 (Iowa
1978).
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consequence of the ability of humans to communicate effectively: most
of the time speakers and writers aim at avoiding irresolvable ambiguity
and listeners and readers are skilled at deciphering ambiguities by attending
to contextual clues.
The relationship between ambiguity, context, and interpretation can be
clarified by examples. Consider once again the ambiguous word “cool.”
In the context, “That refrigerator is running very cool—let’s check the
thermostat,” the ambiguity disappears. Likewise, if someone says, “Miles
Davis was a pioneer of cool jazz,” we know that the intended sense is
not temperature related. This same point can be illustrated with examples
from constitutional law. For example, the phrase “United States” in the
United States Constitution refers to the nation composed of fifty states in
North American and various territories; it does not refer to other political
entities that have been called the United States, such as the United States
of Belgium, the United States of Mexico or the United States of Brazil.
Characteristically, interpretation resolves ambiguity, but in the usual
case, construction resolves vagueness. Interpretation is inapt as a method
for resolving vagueness, because interpretation (the determination of
linguistic meaning or semantic content) cannot do the required work.
When a word or phrase has a linguistic meaning that is vague, then
interpretation runs out. If the linguistic meaning is vague, then vagueness
is the result of interpretation and not a problem to be solved by interpretation.
When interpretation exits the stage, then construction makes its entrance.
Construction allows us to draw a line—making the vague provision more
specific—or gives us a decision procedure, such as a procedure that allows
case-by-case resolution of the vagueness.
In the discussion that follows, we will investigate the possibility that
the constitutional decision whether to incorporate the Bill of Rights via
the privileges or immunities clause must or should be made via a process
of constitutional construction.
B. Incorporation and Vagueness
Is the privileges or immunities clause vague? On some readings of the
clause, it may be. For example, if the meaning of “of” is “shared by
citizens” then there may be borderline cases—rights that are recognized
by almost all of the states and therefore are shared by most but not all
citizens: it might be the case that most but not all states required
indictment by a grand jury at the time the privileges or immunities
clause was adopted. The Fifth Amendment’s command that “No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,” might serve as the basis
for a construction of “privileges or immunities” that included the right.
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Similarly, if “privileges or immunities” were “fundamental” rights or
“natural liberties,” there might be borderline cases—rights for which the
question whether they are fundamental vel non has no determinate
answer. If this were the case, then construction would be required. We
might adopt a rule of construction that afforded decisive weight to the
fact that that a right was included in the Bill of Rights. For example, it
might be argued that the right against self-incrimination is not clearly
fundamental, but that as a matter of constitutional construction, it should
be counted as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States.
There is another way in which the privileges or immunities clause
might be vague. Even if it is clear that a particular abstract right is a
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, that abstract right
may itself be vague. For example, suppose that freedom of speech is
clearly one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. Nonetheless, the question whether a particular state law violates
the freedom of speech may itself involve a borderline case that could
reasonably be resolved either way. Constitutional doctrine might resolve
these borderline cases one way if the actor was the federal government
and another way if the alleged violator was a state or local government.
But this has not been the usual rule of constitutional doctrine (in the
current doctrinal environment in which incorporation is accomplished
via the due process clause). Under the regime of selective incorporation,
some but not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are applied to the
states, but once a provision is “incorporated” then all of the applicable
rules of federal constitutional doctrine are applied as well. This result
would be remarkably difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional
interpretation: the specific contours of first amendment doctrine are even
less plausibly attributed to the privileges or immunities clause than they
are to the First Amendment itself. But this rule might make eminent
sense as a rule of constitutional construction—for a variety of reasons.50

50. We can imagine several reasons for incorporating the details of federal Bill-ofRights doctrine in construction of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges-or-immunities
clause. For example, this might be done as a matter of judicial economy—the federal
doctrine has already been developed. Or it might be done for reasons of fairness—those
persons whose rights are invaded by state governments should be treated similarly to
those rights that are invaded by the federal government. Of course, the claim in this
Article is not that these arguments are correct. They are offered solely for the purpose of
illustrating the way in which wholesale incorporation of federal Bill-of-Rights doctrine
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C. Incorporation and Irreducible Ambiguity
Many problems of constitutional ambiguity can be resolved by constitutional
interpretation—the public context of constitutional utterance may be
sufficient to resolve questions about the public meaning of a text with
more than one acontextual conventional semantic meaning. But it is at
least theoretically possible that there are cases of irreducible
constitutional ambiguity.
At an abstract level we might distinguish between two distinct types of
irreducible ambiguity. We can use the phrase “epistemic ambiguity” to
refer to situations in which the original public meaning (the meaning at
the time a constitutional provision was framed and ratified) could be
resolved based on the contextual clues and linguistic knowledge
available to the public of that time, but in which the passage of time has
resulted in the loss of some of the essential information. For example,
contemporary knowledge of archaic patterns of usage may be not be
sufficiently rich and detailed to permit disambiguation of utterance that
depend on subtle distinctions among the various senses of a given word.
Or information about the context of constitutional utterance may have
been lost: for example, the publicly available context of constitutional
utterance may include information conveyed orally that was never
recorded in written texts, or all of the texts that recorded the information
may have been lost.
Epistemic ambiguity can be contrasted with what we can call “ontological
ambiguity.” It may be the case that some constitutional provisions were
irreducibly ambiguous for the public at the time of origination. There
could be several reasons why this might be the case, including the
following two.
First, it might be the case that the framers of a particular provision
deliberately chose to employ ambiguous language. Such deliberate ambiguity
might be chosen in order to achieve sufficient votes to propose or to
secure ratification of a controversial provision.
Second, it might be the case that the framers of a constitutional
provision were unaware of an ambiguity in the language that they chose.
This might result from partial linguistic isolation of the framers of a
particular provision from the larger linguistic community. For example,
members of Congress who draft a constitutional amendment might mutually
reinforce one another in assuming that the intended meaning of a
particular expression is the unambiguous public meaning. This phenomenon
might involve path dependence. For example, if a potential ambiguity
must be justified as a construction (as distinguished from an interpretation) of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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goes unnoticed early in the drafting process, the interaction among
drafters might reinforce the intended meaning, so that the ambiguity
becomes “invisible” or sounds “absurd” among the group of drafters.
Such linguistic isolation may be reinforced in circumstances where there
are political reasons or practical reasons to limit the drafting process to
“insiders.”
If there were provisions of the constitution that were irreducibly
ambiguous, this fact would present a challenge for originalist theory.
What should an originalist say when constitutional interpretation yields
the conclusion that a particular constitutional provision has one of two
potential meanings? The appropriate response might depend on the
question whether the ambiguity at hand was epistemic or ontological. In
the case of epistemic ambiguity, some originalists might take the position
that contemporary constitutional actors should adopt the interpretation
that is most likely to be correct, even if the level of certainty associated
with that judgment is very low.
But in the case of ontological ambiguity, this option is not available.
In such cases, ambiguity is the bottom line of interpretation. The
semantic content or linguistic meaning of the provision simply is ambiguous
as a matter of fact. In such cases, construction is required to apply the
rule in a determinate fashion to any case in which the ambiguity makes
practical difference. (There may be many cases in which the ambiguity
would not make a difference—the same part would win under either
interpretation.) How might such construction proceed? There are many
possibilities. One might take precedent or historical practice as influential
or even decisive—in cases in which such practice or precedent would
resolve the ambiguity. Keith Whittington suggests that construction
should generally be guided by a principle of deference to the political
branches, and that construction outside the judiciary is a political process.51
Randy Barnett suggests construction should be guided or constrained by
a principle of constitutional legitimacy that requires reasonable assurances
of just outcomes: this mode of construction might require judges to make
substantive judgments about the justice of alternative constructions.52
None of this suggests any particular position on incorporation under
the Bill of Rights via the privileges or immunities clause. Rather, the

51. See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 20; WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 20, at 6.
52. See BARNETT, supra note 20, at 126.
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point of this discussion is to highlight the possibility that irreducible
ambiguity in the meaning of the privileges or immunities clause might
require constitutional construction. When it comes to specific methods
of constitutional construction, many or most originalists may agree that
construction should be bounded by original meaning—at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.53 But originalists disagree about
the proper approach to constitutional construction within those bounds. That
is hardly surprising. The content of theories of constitutional construction is
outside the core commitments of originalism to the fixation thesis and
the contribution thesis.
V. FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION
One final topic remains before we conclude. What, if anything, might
originalists say about the possibility that some provisions of the
constitution lack original meaning altogether? Could an originalist reach
the conclusion that the privileges or immunities clause is an inkblot?
And how might originalists respond to this possibility?
A. Failure of Constitutional Communication in Theory
The Constitution contains many provisions that are vague. And it is
not implausible to believe that the Constitution contains some provisions
that are irreducibly ambiguous as between a constrained set of possible
original meanings. But could an originalist accept the possibility that
there are provisions of the constitution that are literally meaningless? Of
course, it is not difficult to imagine possible constitutions that contain
meaningless provisions: “Amendment 57: In the event of purple
mellifluousness, the mome raths shall grabe.” Or if you think you
understand that, try this: “Amendment 58: k3! 0ck"dk1c#$.” Or
even this %.

53. Of course, “extraordinary circumstances” needs to be defined or clarified.
Some of the relevant considerations are discussed in the next Part of this Article. See
infra Part 0, “V. Failure of Constitutional Communication,” p. 442.
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But the United States Constitution does
not contain gibberish, meaningless strings of
symbols, or inkblots. It does, however, contain
provisions that some readers have characterized
as the functional equivalent of inkblots. When
asked about the Ninth Amendment in
confirmation hearings, Judge Bork responded:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says “Congress shall
make no” and then there is an inkblot and you cannot read the rest of it and that
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be
under the inkblot if you cannot read it.54

And Bork has made a similar suggestion with respect to the privileges or
immunities clause.55 Pace Bork,56 it seems unlikely that there are any
cases of catastrophic failure of constitutional meaning in the actual
Constitution of the United States. Constitutional provisions are drafted
with care, and it would be extraordinarily unusual for a constitutional
provision with no meaning at all to survive the process of framing and
ratification. More plausible is the possibility that a constitutional provision
would be radically ambiguous—with multiple meanings that would have
widely divergent implications for constitutional practice.
B. The (Hypothetical) Case for the Failure of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause
In the case of the privileges or immunities clause, it is at least
conceivable that the clause suffers from multiple and complex forms of
irreducible ambiguity. Suppose, for example, that the drafters mistakenly
believed that the public would generally recognize the phrase “privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States” as a term of art, but in

54. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 224
(1987) (statement of Judge Robert H. Bork); see also Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots And
Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Case of the Ninth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 467, 469 (2008).
55. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990).
56. On the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Lash, supra note 54, at
467.
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fact this recognition was highly inconsistent, with some readers assuming
that “privileges or immunities” simply meant “rights” and others assuming
that it carried a technical legal meaning. It might further be the case that
some readers of the phrase would believe that the meaning of “of” is “by
virtue of” and other readers would believe that the relevant sense of “of”
was “shared by all.” In these circumstances, the meaning of the clause
might be so ambiguous that we might be tempted to say that there had been
a failure of constitutional communication. If the privileges or immunities
clause could be either a natural rights clause or shared-rights clause or a
clause that is limited to those rights that citizens possess by virtue of
their national citizenship, the different senses corresponding to constitutional
doctrines that have little in common with each other.
If the scenario hypothesized in the prior paragraph were actually the
case (and I am not suggesting that it is), then we might be tempted to
characterize the privileges or immunities clause as a case of the failure
of constitutional meaning.
C. Incorporation as a Mending Construction
Failures of constitutional meaning require constitutional construction.
If a given constitutional provision has no linguistic meaning or that
meaning is radically ambiguous, then the translation of semantic content
into legal content cannot proceed mechanically or automatically. A
constitutional construction of some kind is required; without a construction,
constitutional actors would have no basis for the application of the
provision to a particular case. So the question inevitably would arise:
“how should the constitution be construed if there has been a failure of
constitutional communication?”
Once again, there are various possibilities. One of these would simply
be to declare the meaningless clause to be “null and void,” but this is not
the only alternative. Another possibility is to adopt the constitutional
equivalent of a “saving construction.”57 Originalists are generally committed
to the principle that constitutional constructions must be consistent with
the semantic content or linguistic meaning of the Constitution. A
construction that is inconsistent with the original meaning of the
constitutional text might be labeled an amending construction—and both
originalist theory and conventional legal practice agree that that judges
do not have the authority to amend the Constitution.
But there may be some cases in which the commitment to the constitution
requires a construction that is inconsistent with original meaning of the
text. Here is a science fiction example: suppose that a plague resulted in
57.
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the death of all persons who were 35 years of age or older. The text of
the Constitution would result in the conclusion that no one could
constitutionally serve as the President of the United States, but were this
bizarre (and from my perspective terribly unfortunate) turn of events to
transpire, constitutional actors would surely adopt a construction of the
Constitution that preserved constitutional government. They would
adopt a “mending construction” of Article II that repaired the tear in the
constitutional fabric.
The notion of a mending construction might be adapted to the problem
of failures of constitutional meaning. In the case of the privileges or
immunities clause, the doctrine of incorporation might be justified as
such a mending construction. It might be argued that the privileges or
immunities clause simply fails to provide sufficient guidance for identification
of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. One
might then label the provision an Inkblot, and simply write it out of the
constitution altogether—this might be Judge Bork’s preferred alternative.
Or one might adopt a construction of the privileges and immunities
clause that preserves its formal existence, but defines “privileges and
immunities” so narrowly that the clause will provide an absolute
minimum of constraint on state governments—this may be the approach
adopted by the majority in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Or one might go a
different route and adopt the doctrine of incorporation as a mending
construction—not because incorporation is required by the linguistic
meaning of the text, but because this construction is supported by a
variety of concerns—furthering the purposes of the clause, conforming
to the expectations of some or many of those who participated in its
framing and ratification, limiting judicial discretion, achieving justice,
and so forth.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY INCORPORATION MATTERS FOR ORIGINALISTS
As a practical matter, the doctrine of incorporation is of great practical
significance. If originalist theory were to provide decisive reasons for
either affirming or rejecting incorporation, those reasons would certainly
imply that originalism has “bite.” Some originalists may believe
that incorporation should be rejected on originalist grounds; others may
believe the opposite. In this Article, I have suggested that originalists
should be interested in debates over incorporation for an additional and
quite different reason. Incorporation puts originalism through the wringer—
it forces originalists to consider a complex set of issues that push the
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limits of originalist theory. Originalism must confront the tension
between their commitments to “normal meanings” and a constitution
that contains technical terms. Originalism must address the relationship
between originalist interpretation and constitutional construction. And
originalism may be required to give a well-theorized account of the
failure of constitutional meaning.
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